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THE MARITIME BOUNDARIES OF THE STATES
Avrum M. Gross*

I

has long been recognized that the boundaries of coastal states
encompass certain adjoining maritime areas. The settled existence of those boundaries, however, stands in marked contrast to the
confusion which has surrounded their location. The geographic
extent of the waters to which state jurisdiction extends has remained
largely undetermined.
The recent development of refined methods for extracting minerals from offshore areas has translated questions of state jurisdiction
into issues of substantial economic significance. In this regard, an
increasing number of disputes have arisen between the states and
the federal government, primarily over rights to offshore oil deposits. The litigation which has resulted• from these disputes, while
limited to particular aspects of boundary delineation, has inferentially established a framework of general application.1 It is the purpose of this article, through analysis of this series of judicial decisions
and their historical background, to translate that inferential framework into concrete principles of definition.
T

!. THE FUNDAMENTALS FOR ANALYSIS
The navigable waters of the globe are divisible into three basic
categories-inland waters, marginal seas, and high seas. Since high
seas are by definition those waters outside the general jurisdiction
of any sovereign, a discussion of maritime boundaries, of necessity,
focuses on the two remaining classifications.
The marginal or territorial sea is a band of waters abutting the
coast of a nation over which that nation exercises exclusive jurisdiction, except for the right of innocent passage afforded to foreign
vessels.2 The outer limit of the marginal sea is by definition the seaward boundary of the nation. 3
The inland waters of a nation are waters landward of its marginal
• Member of the Alaska Bar.-Ed.
1. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Florida,
363 U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Alaska, 236 F. Supp. 388
(D. Alaska 1964).
2. 1 SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 23 (1962). See generally JESSUP, TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MAru.TIME JURISDICTION (1927).
3. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33 (1947); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1923); l MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 145, at 704 (1906);
1 WHARTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 32, at 107 (1886).
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sea, as well as waters within its land territory. Waters landward of
the marginal sea, in turn, are those waters above the mean low water
line of the sea, and waters landward of the seaward limits of ports,
rivers, bays and harbors.4 To ascertain, in bays or other coastal indentations, the division between inland and territorial waters, a
straight line, called a "baseline," is drawn from headland to headland across the mouth of the indentation or at some place within it.
All waters landward of the line are inland; the marginal sea is
measured seaward from the baseline.5
The distinction between inland waters and the marginal sea
is of obvious significance where national interests are involved.
However, this demarcation is no less significant in determining state
boundaries, since state jurisdiction over the water areas is derived
from different sources, with a resultant divergence in character
depending upon which type of water area is involved.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the individual
states have ownership of all lands beneath inland waters within their
respective boundaries, and exclusive jurisdiction over the water areas
themselves. 6 The Court's analysis was initially premised on the
theory that the original states succeeded to all the rights of the
English Crown.7 Similar authority was conceded to states admitted
after the Revolution, on the theory that those states entered the
Union on an "equal footing" with their predecessors.8
Before 1947 when the Court handed down its decision in United
States v. California,9 it had been generally assumed that state
authority over the marginal sea was identical to that possessed over
inland waters.10 In the California case, however, the two maritime
4. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TIIE SEA 158-60 (5th rev. ed. 1962):
1 SHALowrrz, op. cit. supra note 2, app. A.
5. I SHALowrrz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 281.
6. Sec, e.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (San Pedro Day);
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) (Seattle Harbor); The
Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912) (Gulf of Mexico and Straits of Florida); Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (Buzzards Bay): Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873) (San Francisco Bay); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
71 (1855) (Chesapeake Bay).
7. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
8. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
9. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
10. As the Court itself subsequently noted, the assumption was "not without
reason." Sec United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 16 (1960). In the California case
the Court commented that in applying the doctrine of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (1845), it had "used language strong enough to indicate ••• that states
not only· owned tidelands and soil under navigable inland waters, but also owned
soils .under all navigable waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether inland
or not." 332 U.S. at 36.
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areas were distinguished. In the Court's view, the marginal belt had
been created purely as an attribute of federal sovereignty-an extension of jurisdiction for national, rather than local, purposes.
Since this extension had occurred after the formation of the Union,
the original states could not have derived rights in the marginal belt
as an inherent attribute of their sovereignty.11 Subsequently admitted states which claimed pre-admission authority over the marginal belt were denied continuing author~ty, since the "equal footing" concept required relinquishment of sovereignty over the area
to the federal government upon ~ntrance into the Union.12
The controversy in the California case arose out of a dispute
between the federal government and the state of California over
proprietary rights to lands beneath the marginal sea. The holding,
however, raised doubts whether state jurisdiction of any kind existed
beyond the inland water mark. Concern over this point was dispelled
by the Court's decision the following year m. Toomer v. Witsell, 13
which recognized the states' authority over marginal sea areas within
their boundaries. The California holding was restricted to instances
in which the "paramount" federal authority over the marginal belt
conflicted with an exercise of state jurisdiction. Since no such conflict was evident in Toomer, the principle of the exercise of state
police power over marginal seas was upheld, although the specific
regulations in question were invalidated on constitutional grounds.14
Federal authority over lands underlying the marginal sea was
subsequently abrogated by the Submerged Lands Act.15 Section
3(a)(l) grants to the states "title to and ownership of" all lands
underlying "navigable" waters within their boundaries.16 "Boundaries" include the boundaries possessed by a state at the time it
entered the Union, or as subsequently approved by Congress, but
in no event may such boundaries extend beyond three miles from
the "coast line" in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, or beyond three
leagues in the Gulf of fy{exico. 17 The "coast line" is defined as the
11. See 332 U.S. at 32-35.
12. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950).
13. 334 U .s. 385 (1948).
14. See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 75 (1941), where state regulations over
territorial waters were upheld "in the absence of conflicting federal legislation."
15. 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964). A general discussion of the Submerged Lands Act and the companion Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat.
462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964), may be found in Wright, Jurisdiction in the
Tidelands, 32 TUL. L. REv. 175 (1958).
16. 67 Stat. 30 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(l) (1964).
17. Submerged Lands Act § 2(b), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(b) (1964).
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low water mark on the coast or the "seaward limit of inland waters. " 18
The significance of the Submerged Lands Act is not limited to
the language of grant; section 4 of the act provides that states which
had no defined maritime boundary when admitted to the Union
may extend their boundaries to a point not to exceed three miles
from the "coast line." 19 The insertion of this provision was necessitated by the fact that only a limited number of states possessed maritime boundaries which would have permitted them to claim the
benefits of section 3(a). The original states all claimed inherent
sovereignty over inland waters along the coast, but they made no
claim of sovereignty beyond the inland water boundary.20 Subsequently admitted coastal states entered the Union with authority
over inland waters equal to that of their predecessors, but only a
limited number of the coastal states possessed maritime boundaries
approved by Congress in their acts of admission.21 Therefore, in
addition to the obvious importance of the Submerged Lands Act
as a transfer of federal dominion to all of the coastal states, the act
also stands as an overall congressional sanction' of the maritime
boundaries of a substantial number of states.
It is relevant to note here the absolute necessity of congressional
approval for the establishment of a valid maritime boundary. It is
true that a state's jurisdiction over its residents has been judicially
recognized to extend beyond traditional boundary concepts, without
reference to congressional action of any kind.22 Such recognition,
however, stands merely as a concession to state authority over state
residents wherever they are, and not as support for the proposition
that state action is all that is necessary for the establishment of a
18. Submerged Lands Act § 2(c), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(c) (1964).
19. 67 Stat. 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
20. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1947).
21. The acts of admission of Alabama (Act of March 2, 1819, 3 Stat. 490), Alaska
(Act of July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 339), Hawaii (Act of March 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 4), Louisiana
(Act of April 8, 1812, 2 Stat. 702), Mississippi (Act of March 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 348),
and Oregon (Act of February 14, 1859, 11 Stat. 383) make specific reference to maritime
boundaries. The constitutions of the states of California (1849, art. XII), Florida (1868,
art. 1), and Washington (1889, art. XXIV), which describe maritime boundaries, were
all expressly or impliedly approved by Congress. See respectively: Act of September 9,
1850, 9 Stat. 452; Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73; Act of February 22, 1899, 25 Stat,
676. Texas was admitted to the Union by the Annexation Resolution of Dec. 29,
1845, 9 Stat. 108, wherein Congress consented that "the territory properly included
within, and rightfully belonging to, the Republic of Texas, might be erected into a
new State." The Republic of Texas, including a marine boundary in the Gulf of
Mexico, was defined by the Texas Congress on December 19, 1836 (1 Laws, Republic
of Texas 1193).
22. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). See also Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)
(assertion of federal jurisdiction over United States citizens outside country); United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (same).
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valid "boundary." On the contrary, the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the power to prescribe state boundaries lies exclusively
with Congress, and, while that power may be exercised through
approval of a state's delineation of its boundaries, it is the appr(?val,
rather than the state action, that establishes the boundary.23
The primary difficulty in maritime boundary delineation lies in
the fact that neither the Submerged Lands Act nor any other source
attempts to define clearly the areas circumscribed by these boundaries. Although a description of inland waters is necessary to a determination of the boundaries of all coastal states, no such descriptions are apparent from an analysis of colonial boundaries, and none
is specified in any act of admission or in the Submerged Lands Act.
Several statehood acts describe maritime boundaries in general
terms, such as "appurtenant" territorial waters.24 The Submerged
Lands Act25 and a few of the statehood acts26 provide a specific width
for the marginal sea, but make no attempt to prescribe the manner
in which the defined belt of waters is to be located in relation to the
coast.27 A useful theory of boundary delineation, therefore, requires
a clarification of terminology. The "marginal sea" and "inland
waters" of the states must be defined in a manner which lends itself
readily to geographic description.
II.

DELINEATION OF THE MARGINAL SEA OF THE STATES

Determination of the extent of marginal-sea area included within
a state boundary is the least complex aspect of the problem. The
majority of states entered the Union with no defined maritime
boundary in their acts of admission, 28 and thus derived their authority over marginal-sea areas entirely as a result- of the congressional grant in the Submerged Lands Act. In this regard, section 4
of the act is specific in limiting the maximum breadth of the boundary extension for these states to three miles from the coast line. In
contrast, however, greater difficulties in determining the width of
the marginal sea have developed with respect to those few states
23. See note 38 infra.
24. See, e.g., statebood acts of Alaska and Hawaii cited in note 21 supra.
25. § 4, 67 Stat. 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
26. See statehood act of Oregon and constitutions of Florida, California, and
Washington cited in note 21 supra.
27. The difficult problem of determining the exact point on the coast from which
to measure the marginal-sea belt is discussed in Part Ill infra.
28. As noted above, see note 20 supra and accompanying text, the thirteen original
states asserted no maritime claims outside of inland waters. In addition, neither the
statebood act nor the original constitution of the state of Maine established any
maritime boundary whatsoever. See Act of March 3, 1820, 3 Stat. 544.
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which entered the Union with congressionally approved boundaries
apparently in excess of three miles from the coast. Texas, Louisiana,
Alabama, Mississippi and Florida all claimed such boundaries,20 but
the United States Government has continually refused to recognize
the validity of claims beyond three miles, on the theory that since
the marginal sea of the nation is established at three miles from the
coast,30 state authority cannot extend beyond the three-mile limit.
The claims of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were all
predicated on somewhat similar clauses in their acts of admission,
which described Mississippi and Alabama as "including all islands
within six leagues of the shore," 31 and described Louisiana as "including all islands .within three leagues of the coast." 82 The states
contended that this reference to offshore islands implied that all
waters between the islands and the mainland were included within
the territory of the state. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that although the islands were part of the state,
the only water areas similarly included were the various three-mile
belts around the islands.33 The Court found no conflict between
state and national policy in this regard, since, in its opinion, the acts
of admission evinced no attempt by the United States to claim any
more of the marginal sea than that sanctioned by national policy.
In t\V'O cases involving Texas34 and Florida,85 however, a conflict
between state and federal policy was squarely presented. Both states
entered the Union with congressionally approved boundaries in the
Gulf of Mexico three leagues from the shore.86 Congressional action
in this regard was in direct contrast to the announced foreign policy
of the State Department, which advocates a marginal sea of three
miles for the United States and other countries.87 The Court's resolu29. See United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana,
363 U.S. I (1960).
30. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Cunard S.S. Co, v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100, 122 (1922). The traditional position of the United States in support of the
three-mile limit is reviewed in I MOORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 145, at 705; I WHARTON,
op. cit, supra note 3, § 32, at 107.
31. Alabama: Act of March 2, 1819, 3 Stat. 490; Mississippi: Act of March I, 1817,
3 Stat. 348.
112. Act of April 8, 1812, 2 Stat. 702.
33. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 66-83 (1960).
34. Id. at 36-65. See text accompanying note 122 infra.
35. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
36. See note 21 supra.
37. The Court, in United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I (1960), was careful to point
out that the policy of the executive branch establishes a "boundary" for the nation
only in a "special sense." The United States, like other nations, has traditionally
exerted control over certain activities, such as smuggling, at varying distances from
its coast. See Anti-Smuggling Act, 49 Stat. 517 (1935), as amended, 19 U.S,C. §§ 1701-11
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tion of this apparent conflict was a recognition of the congressionally
approved boundaries, with a further recognition of the inherent
power of the executive branch to control the exercise of certain
activities within the boundaries.88
An example may clarify the foregoing result. The exercise of
state control over fishing up to a boundary of three marine leagues
is obviously inconsistent with the foreign policy of the nation, which
recognizes United States jurisdiction only up to a boundary of three
miles. Thus, although Texas and Florida have congressionally approved maritime boundaries three leagues from the coast, the foreign
policy of the nation prohibits those states from exercising rights
over fisheries outside of the traditional three-mile marginal belt.
This curtailment does not affect the boundary itself, but only the
rights which may be exercised within it, much as a federal treaty
may curtail state police power over areas of land within state
borders.89
The limiting effect of foreign policy disappears when the boundary question involves a matter of solely domestic concern. The Submerged Lands Act is directed to just such a situation. Since the
United States has already laid claim, as against all other nations, to
all mineral resources underlying the continental shelf,40 the division
of those resources between the states and the federal governments
is a purely domestic problem; whatever the division, the foreign
policy of the nation will remain unaffected.41 Therefore, since in the
(1964). See also 62 Stat. 799 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2152 (1964) (defense purposes). While
the three-mile limit may indicate the point at which these rights and others are
concentrated, even the marginal sea is subject to rights of innocent passage by foreign
vessels. Thus it can be seen that the authority which may be asserted to protect a
maritime boundary is more limited than in the case of a boundary dividing the land
areas of two sovereigns.
38. "The power to admit new States resides in Congress. The President, on the
other hand, is the constitutional representative of the United States in- its dealings
with foreign _nations. From the former springs the power to establish state boundaries;
from the latter comes the power to determine how far this country will claim territorial rights in the marginal sea as against other nations." United States v. Louisiana,
supra note 37, at 35. In a similar vein, the Court noted: "It may indeed be that the
Executive, in the exercise of its power, can limit the enjoyment of certain incidents of
a Congressionally conferred boundary, but it does not fix that boundary." Id. at 51.
39. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
40. By Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945), the United
States asserted "jurisdiction and control" over "the national resources of the subsoil
and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States."
41. "[I]n light of the purely domestic purposes of the Act, we see no irreconcilable
conflict between the Executive policy relied on by the Government and the historical
events claimed to have fixed seaward boundaries for some States in excess of three
miles." United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 33 (1960).
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Submerged Lands Act the states were granted all lands underlying
navigable waters within their boundaries as previously approved by
Congress, Texas and Florida were both free to exercise rights of
ownership to the full extent of those boundaries, regardless of
whether their rights might be limited as to other activities.
Thus, it can be seen that the geographic breadth of the marginal
sea is readily ascertainable. For all coastal states but two, the maximum extent of maritime areas which may be included within the
boundary is a three-mile belt measured from the coast. In the two
remaining states, the boundary is located three leagues seaward of
the coast in the Gulf Stream, and three miles seaward at other locations.
III. DELINEATION OF THE INLAND WATERS OF THE STATES

The most difficult problem of boundary location is not in determining the breadth of the marginal-sea belt, but rather its location. There is general agreement that the marginal sea is measured
from the low-water mark on the coast or from the seaward limit of
inland waters. 42 While determination of the low-water mark has
caused only minor difficulty,43 the absence of any settled definition
of "the seaward limit of inland waters" has created problems of the
greatest magnitude.
Prior to attempting a definition, it is necessary to review certain
historical developments in the international law of the sea. Although
marginal-sea areas have been described precisely by Congress, no
specific domestic definition of inland waters is available. Fortunately,
however, a definition of inland waters has evolved within the framework of the law of nations; a meaningful analysis of the term must
commence with a review of that evolution.

A. Inland Waters as Defined by International Law
Where the coastline of a nation is straight or subject to only
slight curvature, generally accepted principles of international law
require that the marginal-sea belt, whatever its width, follow the
42. See authorities cited note 44 infra.
43. Since there are two low tides each day on any particular coast, there had been
some question as to whether the low-water mark was to be derived from the average
of all low tides, or from averaging only the lower low tides. Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention of the Law of the Sea uses "the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the Coastal State." Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 3, T.I.A.S, No,
5639. For the United States, the recognized charts are those of the United States
Coast and Geodetic Survey, which adopt the lower low-water line. See United States
v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 176 (1965).
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sinuosities of the low-water mark on the coast.44 In areas where the
coastline is sharply indented, however, the task of locating the marginal sea is more complex. In the case of harbors, bays, and estuaries,
it has traditionally been conceded that the coastal nation may mea. sure the marginal sea from a line drawn across the mouth of the
indentation or at some point within it. Waters landward of this _baseline are internal waters of the coastal nation. 45
The establishment . of a precise formula for ascertaining the
proper location and maximum length of a baseline within bays has
created one of the more substantial and durable disputes among nations. The earliest numerical formulation was the most obvious.
Since three miles was the normally accepted width of a territorial
sea, any opening up to six miles in width was already subject to control by a coastal nation surrounding the indentation; it was therefore
argued that a baseline six miles in length was proper for separation
of inland and territorial waters within bays.46 The six-mile limitation, while reasonable in theory, never gained general acceptance
as a rule of international law. Certain nations, for reasons of convenience, insisted that an opening of ten miles could validly be enclosed by a baseline.47 Moreover, a leading group of international
experts asserted that twelve miles would constitute a valid closing
line.48 While seeking a precise definition of inland waters, nations
were equally anxious to disregard any specific mathematical criterion
when it suited their advantage to do so.49
44. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Letter from Secretary of State Bayard to Secretary of the
Treasury Manning, May 28, 1886, 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 149, at 718-21. But
see 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 29-30 (1832), where the author advocates
measurement of the marginal sea of the United States from straight lines drawn
between distant headlands, "as for instance, from Cape Ann to Cape Cod." Kent's
view is cited approvingly in The Kodiak, 53 Fed. 126 (D. Alaska 1892).
45. Early writings suggest a disparity of view on this matter. Despagnet and Hall,
whose views are reprinted in THE ExTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA 53-58, 64-83 (Crocker
ed. 1919), both apparently believed that a baseline in bays represented the outer limit
of the marginal sea. This view was soon discarded. See JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 475.
46. The six-mile rule has been referred to by the Supreme Court as "the minimum
limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tide-waters." Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891). See CoLOMBos, op. cit. supra note 4, at 162.
47. The origin of the ten-mile figure has been traced to an 1893 treaty between
England and France. Subsequent international compacts adopted this limitation, often
verbatim. See CoLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 162-63; writings of Bonfils, de Lapradelle, and Latour, reprinted in THE ExTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA, op. cit. supra note
45, at 11-13, 183-274.
·
48. See Scorr, REsoLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 (1916).
49. See Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394
(P.C. 1877) (Newfoundland) (Conception Bay); The Alleganean (Stetson v. United
States); 4 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 4332 (1898) (2d Ct. of Comm'rs of Ala.
Claims) (Chesapeake Bay); 1 OPS. ATT'Y GEN. 33 (1793) (Delaware Bay).
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The first test of the existence of any established rule of international law defining inland waters within bays arose in the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration.50 The dispute concerned the
interpretation of an 1818 treaty between the United States and Great
Britain which prohibited American fishermen from fishing within
three nautical miles,of any "bays, creeks or harbors of His Britannic
Majesty's dominions in America."51 The British Government contended that the term "bays" referred to all indentations, regardless
of the distance between headlands at their mouth. The United
States argued that, under international law in force at the time of
the treaty, "bays" meant only small indentations, and that the maximum length of a closing line between headlands in a bay was six
miles. The arbitration tribunal rejected all subsequently accepted
lines of a particular length as arising out of "international acts" and
"relating to coasts of a different configuration and conditions of a
different character." 52 Instead, the tribunal couched its understanding of applicable principles in general terms, holding that the threemile marginal-sea belt was "to be measured from a straight line
drawn across the body of water at the place where it ceases to have
the configuration and characteristics of a bay." 58
Although the tribunal refused to recognize any accepted rule of
international law mathematically delimiting the size of bays, it was
willing to concede that its general statement of principle was "not
entirely satisfactory as to its practical applicability." 64 Therefore, the
tribunal suggested that both parties agree that, with certain exceptions, the baseline in bays should be dra·wn at the first point therein
"where the width does not exceed ten miles." 65 The result of the
decision, therefore, was a rejection of the ten-mile rule as a principle
of international law, and a concurrent adoption of that length as a
matter of practicality.
The holding of this arbitration tribunal, coupled with the subsequent failure of the Hague Conference on the Law of the Sea to
arrive at any significant agreement on the question of closing lines
50. S. Doc. No. 870, 61st Cong.. 3d Sess. (1910-11). The Arbitration was held at
The Hague in 1910. The most comprehensive analysis of the proceeding is found in
JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 2, at 363-82.
51. Convention with Great Britain, respecting fisheries, boundary, and the restoration of slaves, art. I, Oct. 20, 1818, reprinted in THE Ex.TENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA, op.
cit. supra note 45, at 646-47. See JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 2, at 365.
52. Id. at 374.
53. Id. at 377.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid,
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in bays,56 cast great doubt on the international applicability of the
ten-mile rule. Moreover, the concept of a standard length for all
baselines was rejected by the International Court of Justice in the
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway).57 The issue before the
court concerned the validity of Norway's claim that vast water areas
abutting her coast were inland waters. Great Britain, faced with a
possible loss of valuable fishing rights, argued that baselines drawn
across fjords and bays were limited to a maximum length of ten
miles. The court rejected the British argument, holding that:
[A]lthough the ten-mile rule has been accepted by certain
States both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it
as between these States, other States have adopted a different
limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the
authority of a general rule of international law.58
After rejecting the ten-mile baseline approach as a rule of law,
the International Court upheld a Norwegian scheme of boundary
measurement which exhibited a new and flexible approach toward
the definition of inland waters. Norway's coastline is highly irregular and liberally sprinkled with nearby rock formations and islands.
Instead of measuring its marginal-sea belt from the low-water mark
on the coast, Norway established a straight baseline system circumscribing the outer fringe of the so-called Skeerkagaard, or island
fringe. For ·this purpose, a line was drawn from the mainland to the
outer limit of the island fringe and thence from island to island
until eventually it returned to the mainland. Waters landward of
the line were claimed as inland, and the marginal belt was extended
seaward from this artificial "coast." It is interesting to note that this
baseline utilized by Norway occasionally reached sixty miles or
more in length bet1\Teen points of land. Nevertheless, in the coUl't's
view a claim to inland waters was to be tested by reference to three
basic criteria:
56. The 1930 Hague Conference was called to consider the codification of various
branches of international law, including the law of the sea. See REsEARcH IN INTER•
NATIONAL LAW, DRAFT CONVENTIONS AND COMMENTS ON NATIONALITY, RllsPONSIBILlTY OF
STATES FOR INJURIES TO AuENs, AND TERRITORIAL WATERS 243-45 (1929), as reprinted in
23 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. (1929). Neither the draft nor any substitute convention was
adopted at the conference. United States proposals in regard to bays, together with
French proposals on the same subject, are reprinted in 3 ACTS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR
THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL l.Aw 195-97 (League of Nations Pub. No. 1930, v.
16).
57. (1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
58. Id. at 131.
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1. the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land

domain;
2. the more or less close relationship existing between certain
sea areas and the land formations which divide or surround
them; [and]
3. economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and im•
portance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage. 60
The court's approval of the Norwegian system heralded a totally
new approach to the delineation of inland waters. The decision rejected any mathematical limitation on baselines, and, by approving
the straight-baseline method, the court sanctioned the subjection of
large areas of water previously thought of as marginal or high seas
to the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal nations. The significance of
this approval can readily be shown by reference to the accepted
methods of delineation which preceded it. Formerly, islands abutting a coast were treated as separate land areas, possessing their own
inland waters and marginal seas.60 Water areas which were
between the islands and the coast, but outside the marginal-sea
belt of either land mass, were defined as high seas. Even if an
island were within six miles of a coast, the intervening water areas
were considered marginal seas, and were therefore subject to rights
of innocent passage by foreign vessels. 61 The straight-baseline
method, which treats island clusters as extensions of the coast, may
therefore have an enormous effect on the maritime rights of nations.
The Fisheries Case, coupled with general concern over the lack
of fixed standards for ascertaining inland waters, set the stage for
debate on the question at the First Law of the Sea Conference convened at Geneva in 1958.62 This conference was the first serious at59. Id. at 133.
60. See COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA 103·04 (5th rev. ed. 1962): Letter
from Secretary Webb to Attorney General McGrath, Nov, 13, 1951, Hearings on S.J.
Res. 13 Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. 460, at 461 (1953); Pearcy, Measurement of ·the United States Territorial Sea,
U.S. Bureau of Public Affairs, Dep't of State Publication No. 6879 (1959).
61. A strait between an island or islands and the mainland may not be subjected
to the exclusive control of a coastal nation, regardless of width, if the strait serves as a
useful route for international passage between two areas of high seas. Judgment of
April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 28 (Corfu Channel Case). The fact that international
traffic is limited, or almost non-existent, is not decisive. See I SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND
SEA BOUNDARIES 75-76 (1962) •
• 6!:t. The Conference was convened pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 54 (A/3572)
(1957), stated that the General Assembly: "Decides, in accordance with the recom•
mendation contained in paragraph 28 of the report of the International Law Com•
mission covering the work of its eighth session, that an international conference of
plenipotentiaries should be convoked to examine the law of the sea, taking account
not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic and political as•
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tempt to establish a codification of the law of the sea since the International Conference at The Hague in 1930. Although the Geneva
Conference, like its predecessor, was unable to resolve the key question of the maximum width of the territorial sea, 68 it did result in
general agreement on rules for the maximum length of baselines for
inland bays, as well as the establishment of a series of conditions £or
the use of straight baselines.
Although the Fisheries Case apparently destroyed the possibility
of adopting the ten-mile rule for bays, the majority of the participants at Geneva agreed that some limitation on the length of the
bay-closing line was necessary.64 The effect of this concurrence of
opinion is reflected in article 7 of the adopted Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which provides that where the
distance between the low-water marks of natural entrance points of a
bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four
miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as' to enclose
the maximum area of water. Waters landward of the line are inland
waters of the coastal nation.
It is quite clear, however, that before such a baseline can be applied in particular cases there must be a prior determination of what
types of indentations qualify as "bays." Indiscriminate application
of the twenty-four mile rule to each curvature in the coast, regardless
of depth, would obviously be inconsistent with the overall purpose
of the rule to recognize the legitimate interests of a nation over its
coastal waters. Therefore, the Convention adopted the so-called
semi-circular test of definition. Under this test, as expressed in
article 7 of the Convention, true bays must constitute more than
mere curvatures in the coast, contain landlocked waters, and contain
an area as large or larger than that of a semi-circle whose diameter
is a line drawn across the mouth of the indentation. 65
pects of the problem, and to embody the results of its work in one or more international conventions or such other instruments as it may deem appropriate • • • ."
Eighty-six nations and more than seven hundred delegates attended the Conference.
A review of their work is found in Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, 59 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 234 (1959).
63. A second conference convened in Geneva on March 17, 1960, and was also
unable to reach agreement on this matter. See 1 SHALOWITZ, op. cit. supra note 61, at
269-76.
64. The draft articles prepared for the Convention by the International Law Commission originally incorporated a closing line of twenty-five miles. When the proposal
met with a cool reception by some states, the Commission reduced the line to fifteen
miles. 1956 I.L.C. YEARBOOK I, 190-93, 195-97.
65. The full text of article 7 is as follows:
I. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State.
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose

652

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:639

The Convention was also successful in reaching agreement on
limiting the application of the straight-baseline method for delineating inland waters. Article 4 recognizes that a coastal nation may
establish straight baselines from point to point on its coast if the
following conditions exist: (1) The coastline is deeply indented or
cut into, or there is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity of
the coast; (2) the drawing of baselines does not depart to an appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast; and (3) the sea
areas within the lines bear a sufficient nexus to the land areas to be
subject to the domain of the nation over its internal waters.
In addition to establishing standards for the application of the
straight-baseline method, the Convention imposed specific limits on
its utilization in -certain areas. Section 5 of article 4 prohibits the
use of straight baselines where the effect is to cut off from the high
seas the territorial waters of another nation. Section 2 of article 5
specifies that if straight baselines enclose waters previously thought
to be territorial or high seas, a right of innocent passage exists
through such waters. Thus in essence the Convention created a new
concept of inland waters which could be subject to international
rights. 66
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or
larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the
mouth of that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying
between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the
presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall
be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the
different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were
part of the water areas of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between
these two lo,v-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as
internal waters.
·
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance
points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles
shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area
of water that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in
any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.
Convention on ,the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art, 7,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
66. Aside from the two major issues covered in article 4, para. 5, and article 5,
para. 2, the Convention also disposed of a multitude of other boundary problems,
The difficulties associated with measurement of the marginal sea from harbors were
resolved by article 8, which prescribes measurement from "the outermost permanent
harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system." Article 13 provides that if a river flows directly into the sea, the marginal sea is to be measured ,
from a straight line drawn across the mouth between points on the low tide line of
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The ratification of twenty-two nations required by the Convention was achieved on September 10, 1964. Consequently, there are
at present established rules of international law defining the extent
of the inland waters of coastal nations. These rules, in part, recognize
that all "true" bays which may be enclosed by a twenty-four mile
closing line are inland bays of the coastal nation. In addition, if conditions are proper, a nation may establish straight baselines as the
line of demarcation between inland waters and the marginal sea.
B. The Inland-Water Policy of the Executive Branch
The rules of international law defining inland waters are, to a
large extent, permissive. Thus, within certain limits individual nations are free to formulate the ~les of definition which they feel
can most reasonably be applied to their coasts. The establishment of
such rules for the coast of the United States is peculiarly and traditionally a function of the executive branch of the Government.67
Early in the nation's dev~lopment, claims over inland waters
were understandably vague. Secretary of State Jefferson, in a letter
to French Secretary Genet, -claimed authority over all "landlocked
bays" •Of the United States, but he offered no explanation as to how
those bays were to be defined. 68 Similarly, without reference to closing lines of any nature, Attorney General Edmund Randolph once
asserted an American claim to all of Chesapeake Bay, which is twelve
miles in width. 69 The first precise statement of United States policy
on inland waters appears in a letter dated May 28, 1886, from Secretary of State Bayard to Treasury Secretary Manning.70 Referring
to the propriety of drawing a baseline between headlands within
bays, Secretary Bayard stated that "the headland theory, as it is
called, has been uniformly rejected by our Government ...." 71
its banks. Article 11 specifies what low tide elevations may be used for measurement
of the marginal sea. Article 10 reasserts the doctrine that each island possesses its own
marginal sea.
67. As a general matter, the extent of United States sovereignty is a political
question, "the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens
and subjects of that government." Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
See also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257 (1907); In re Cooper, 143
U.S. 472 (1892). Congress has never acted in any manner to define the inland waters
of the nation, with the result that the actions of the executive branch stand alone in
this field.
68. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 183 (1833).
69. l OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 32 (1793).
70. 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 149, at 718-21 (1906).
71. While rejecting the utilization of any baseline for the United States coast, the
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As the ten-mile baseline became sanctioned by continued use,
the United States eventually adopted this standard in its international affairs. On February 15, 1888, following a pattern suggested
by Umpire Bates in the case of The Washington, 72 the State Department entered into a treaty with Great Britain which incorporated
the ·ten-mile rule.73 Notwithstanding the fact that the Senate rejected
this treaty, 74 the State Department apparently remained convinced
that a ten-mile closing line was proper under international law, and
counsel for the United States asserted the applicability of the rule
in the Alaska Boundary Arbitration of 1904.75 At the Hague Conference of 1930, the United States urged_ the adoption of the ten-mile
standard as proper for defining inland waters within bays.76 On
November 13, 1951, Acting Secretary of State Webb declared American adherence to the ten-mile rule in a detailed letter to Attorney
General McGrath, and this policy was reaffirmed in a subsequent
letter from Secretary of State Acheson to the Attorney General on
February 12, 1952.77
Secretary Acheson's declaration was necessitated by the fact that
the Fisheries Case had substantially destroyed the foundation on
which previous American policy had been premised. As the Secretary noted, "some ... principles on which this United States position
has been traditionally predicated have been deemed by the Court
not to have acquired the authority of a general rule of international
Secretary nonetheless recognized the practice of other nations. "The doctrine is new
and has received a proper limit in the convention between France and Great Britain
of the 2d of August, 1839, in which it is equally agreed that the distance of three
miles fixed as the general limit for the exclusive right of fishery upon the coasts of
the two countries shall, with respect to bays the mouths of which do not exceed ten
miles in width, be measured from a straight line drawn from headland to headland."
Id. at 719.
72. 4 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ArulITRATIONS 4342 (1898).
73. Article III provided: "The three marine miles mentioned in Article I of the
convention of October 20, 1818 shall be measured seaward from low water mark; but
at every bay, creek, harbor, not otherwise. specially provided for in this Treaty, such
three marine miles shall be measured seaward from a straight line drawn across the
bay, creek, or harbor, in the part nearest the entrance at the first point where the
width does not exceed ten marine miles." 2 S. Misc. Doc. No. 109, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.
156 (1888).
74. 19 CONG. REc. 7768 (1888).
75. The arbitration involved the location of the boundary between southern Alaska
and Canada, which, in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825, was set at ten leagues inland from the "coast." The arguments pertaining to boundaries may be found in 7
Alaska Boundary Arbitration, S. Doc. No. 162, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1904).
76. 3 Aars OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 197-99
(Leagne of Nations Pub. No. 1930, v. 16).
77. The two letters are printed in Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, supra note 60, at 46062.
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law." 78 Primary among those principles were the ten-mile baseline
rule and the measurement of the marginal sea from the sinuosities
of the coast. As the Secretary was careful to point out, the failure of
the court to accept the foregoing principles ~s rules of international
law did not mean that they were in conflict with that law. Indeed,
the decision left "the choice of the method of delimitation applicable
under such criteria to the national state." 79 Exercising its prerogative
in this regard, the Department of State specifically refused to utilize
straight baselines to delineate inland waters of the nation, and confirmed its adherence to the ten-mile rule as proper for definition of
inland bays.
The United States was a signatory of the Geneva Convention,
and although the Department of State undoubtedly would have
preferred the adoption of less liberal rules for delineating maritime
boundaries, particularly in reference to the twenty-four mile closing
line for bays, the chairman of the American delegation to the Convention subsequently indicated that the United States was not dissatisfied with any of the final provisions.80 The Senate indicated its
consent to the Convention in 1960,81 and on March 24, 1961, presidential ratification was attained. Acting under the terms of the
Convention, the United States has subsequently claimed that all
American bays which may be closed by a twenty-four mile line are
inland waters.82 The Government has not, however, sought to apply
the straight-baseline method to any portion of the United States
coast.
C. Inland Waters as Defined by Congress-The Submerged

Lands Act
Thus far, we have considered the definition of inland waters
within the framework of international relations. Although the definitions utilized by the executive branch of our government have
obvious domestic· significance, the definitions themselves are not
based entirely on internal considerations. Whatever definitions the
United States adopts for itself will affect, at least indirectly, the interests of other nations, and the constantly reiterated desire of this
78. Id. at 462.
79. Ibid.
80. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Executives
]. to N. Inclusive, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (Question No. 29) (1960).
81, 106 CONG. REc. 11187-96 (1960).
.
82. Letter from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, Jan. 15, 1963, in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 527 (1963).
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nation to maximize the extent of the high seas has had a significant
limiting effect on our own claims to inland waters. 88
Congressional passage of the Submerged Lands Act created the
necessity for a definitiqn of inland waters in an entirely different
context. The primary purpose of the act was to provide for a division of offshore mineral resources between state and federal authority. Since the areas in question had already been claimed by the
federal government as against all other nations, the statutory definition of inland waters adopted in the act would not affect the
foreign policy of the executive branch. Thus, Congress was free to
adopt whatever definition of the term it felt would best effectuate
the policies of the act.
The significance of a definition of "inland waters," as used in the
act, is twofold. First, the congressional grant of lands underlying
navigable waters within state boundaries is limited to three miles
from the "coast line" in most cases and three leagues from the coast
in limited instances.84 The term "coast line" is, in part, defined as
the "seaward limit of inland waters." 80 Second, for those states which
had no clearly defined maritime boundary at the date of passage, the
act permits an extension of current boundaries to three miles from
the "coast line." 86 A definition of inland waters is therefore indispensable for proper application of the act.
Although the necessity for a definition seems clear, congressional
understanding of that necessity was apparently absent. Indeed, the
legislative history of the act indicates a deliberate failure by
Congress to specify any theory of inland-water measurement. One
of the early Senate resolutions defined the "coast line" in the following terms:
The term "coast line" means the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with
the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland
waters, which include all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, channels, straits, historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of
water which join the open sea. 81
The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs requested
State Department analysis of the boundary questions raised by the
legislation. In response, the Department presented extensive testi83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, supra note 60, at 1053 (testimony of Mr. Tate).
Submerged Lands Act § 2(b), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(b) (1964).
Submerged Lands Act § 2(c), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(c) (1964).
Submerged Lands Act § 4, 67 Stat. 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964).
See Hearings on S.J. Res. IJ, supra note 60, at 1051-58. (Emphasis added.)
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mony, 88 making it clear that the ten-mile rule was firmly established
as an Executive definition of inland waters within bays and that
the straight-baseline method of the Fisheries Gase had not been
adopted.89 On the basis of this testimony, the Committee deleted all
of the explanatory language following the words "inland waters,"
leaving the term without qualification. In explanation of its action,
the Committee stated:
The words "which include all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays,
channels, straits, historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies
of watei: which join the open sea" have been deleted from the
reported bill because of the committee's belief that the question
of what constitutes inland waters should be left where Congress
finds it. The committee is convinced that the definition neither
adds nor takes away anything a State may have now in the way
of a coast and the lands underneath waters behind it.
In this connection, however, the committee states categorically that the deletion of the quoted language in no way constitutes an indication that the so-called "Boggs Formula," the
rule limiting bays to areas whose headlands are not more than
IO miles apart, or the artificial "arcs of circles" method is or
should be the policy of the United States in delimiting inland
waters or defining coastlines.90
While refusing to adopt the specific definition of inland waters
utilized by the executive branch, the legislative branch. concurrently
refused to provide its own standard of measurement. This refusal
stemmed from the congressional assumption that a definition of inland waters had already been firmly established by the judiciary, as
evidenced by the fact that debate on the act is replete with references
to the judicially "fixed" definition of inland waters.91 In fact, how88. See testimony of Mr. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
Hearings on S.J. Res. l!J, supra note 60, at 1051-86.
89. Id. at 1052, 1058.
90. 2 U.S. CODE CONG.&: An. NEWS 1493 (1953).
91. For instance, in explanation of the deletion of the language from § 2(c), Senator
Cordon stated: "It was not the chairman's view that we were attempting to draw a
line delimiting inland waters, but that we were using a term that is well known in the
law and is defined by the Court in the California case, for instance, and in the Louisiana case, I assume." (Emphasis added.) Hearings on S.J. Res. l!J, supra note 60, at
1376. In later debates, Senator Cordon answered an assertion that the committee had
rejected ·the Boggs formula by saying: "The committee, as I recall, and I think I am
correct, neither accepted nor rejected the Boggs formula or any other formula." 99
CONG. R.Ec. 2633 (1953). In reference to California's boundary claim, Senator Holland
remarked: "The Senator from Florida believes that the laws, as announced over and
over and over again by the Supreme Court, as to the delimitation of inland waters,
. are sufficiently fixed, definite, and certain so that it would require a complete,
cataclysmic change of the Supreme Court's philosophy in that field to afford any
hope for an extension of the boundaries of the good State of California so that they
would go out beyond the islands as to all areas contained within an outer line." 99
CONG. REc. 275 (1953).
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ever, this congressional assumption was completely at variance with
reality. The Supreme Court, prior to the passage of the Submerged
Lands Act, had only once indicated an opinion as to whether particular waters were "inland," and it had done so in a manner which
bore no relation to an overall definition of the term. 92 Moreover the
lower courts indicated a complete disparity of views. The District
Court in Alaska, citing Kent's Commentaries, had held that Cook
Inlet, a body of water forty miles across at its mouth, was inland.98
Similarly, after referring to the Webster's Dictionary definition of a
"bay," a California court upheld the jurisdiction of the State of
California over Monterey Bay, which is eighteen miles wide at its
mouth. 04 Other courts had defined inland waters on totally unrelated
grounds.95
The assumed judicial definition of inland waters, therefore, was at
best contradictory, and at worst totally absent. The result of this
absence was an obvious confusion as to the respective rights of
federal and state governments in offshore lands, a confusion which
ultimately necessitated judicial resolution.
D. The Judicial Definition of Inland Waters-United States
v. California,96 1965
The dispute between the federal government and the State of
California was initially concerned solely with title to lands underlying the three-mile marginal belt. The Supreme Court's first decision in this matter, in 1947, settled that issue in favor of the federal
government but left open for determination the precise location of
the subject lands.07 To obtain evidence necessary for a judicial deter92. In Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891), the Court, in de•
termining the inland waters of Massachusetts, commented: "We think it must be
regarded as established that, as between nations, the minimum limit of the terri•
torial jurisdiction of a nation over tide-waters is a marine league from its coast; that
bays wholly within its territory not exceeding two marine leagues in width at the
mouth are within this limit • • • ," Since the bay in question was less than six miles
wide at its mouth, the Court was not required to establish the maximum limits for
inland waters.
93. The Kodiak, 53 Fed. 126 (D. Alaska 1892). Since the enactment of the Sub•
merged Lands Act, a Superior Court in Alaska has held that all waters of Bristol
Bay landward of a line 160 miles in length across the bay are territorial waters of
the state. Alaska v. Arctic Maid Fisheries, No. 7093-A, Super. Ct. Alaska, 1st Jud.
Dist., 1962. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in the Alaska Supreme
Court urging reversal, but the case was subsequently dismissed.
94. Ocean Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 Pac. 722 (1927).
95. See United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (San Pedro
Bay); People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939) (Santa Monica Bay).
96. 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
97. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
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mination of the baseline separating the inland waters of the state
from the marginal sea, the Court referred the case to a Special
Master, restricting the hearing to seven disputed segments of the
California coast. The Master's report was submitted to the Court in
1952,98 but the case was seemingly rendered moot by the intervening
passage of the Submerged Lands Act, granting marginal sea lands to
the states. The matter remained technically before the Supreme
Court, but was allowed to lie dormant.99
As oil exploration moved seaward, however, the outer limit of
the marginal belt became as significant for states as· the seaward limit
of inland waters had been at the time of the initial decision. Since
the former limit is directly related to the latter, it was obvious that
the issues basic to the Master's hearing were also crucial to an ultimate determination of the case, and that the passage of the Submerged Lands Act, rather than rendering the issues moot, had
merely modified them. The Government therefore filed an amended
complaint in 1963~ squarely presenting for the Supreme Court's
determination a definition of the term "inland waters," not as
originally considered by the Master, but rather as utilized by Congress in the Submerged Lands Act.100
The areas in controversy fell into two major categories. The primary area of dispute, designated the "overall unit area," consisted
of waters circumscribed by a line drawn from the California mainland to a series of islands, some as much as fifty miles from the coast,
and then returning to the mainland. The secondary area consisted
of a series of ·unrelated indentations along the coast.101
The United States' position toward all the disputed areas was
simple and direct: Congress, in adopting the Submerged Lands Act,
had incorporated into its provisions the contemporaneous definition
of inland waters espoused by the executive branch. Under this
theory, the "overall unit area" did not qualify as inland waters since
it utilized the straight-baseline principle, which had been specifically
rejected by the State Department.102 The claims of California over
the various coastal indentations were rejected, on the theory that all
but one of the indentations failed to qualify as "bays" under all
98. The Master's report· is reprinted in 1 SHALOWITZ, op. cit. supra note 61, at
329-53.
99. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 148 (1965).
100. Id. at 149.
101. The geographic extent of the disputed areas is shown in the maps constitut-

ing appendixes A, B, and C to the Court's opinion.
102. See text following note 79 supra.
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recognized theories of inland water measurement. While one indentation, Monterey Bay, did qualify as a "bay" under the present
policy of the executive branch, the Government argued that since
the bay was eighteen miles wide at its mouth and since United States
policy at the time of the adoption of the Submerged Lands Act recognized only a ten-mile closing line, the area was not inland waters
of the state within the meaning of the act.
California presented several alternative arguments in defense of
its claims. First, it argued that since the Submerged Lands Act
was designed to restore the states to the position they were thought
to be in prior to the Court's decision in the first California case, the
terms of the act should be construed liberally as a congressional approval of state "belief" as to the limits of their inland waters prior
to 1947. Alternatively, California argued that the Submerged Lands
Act should be interpreted consistently with international law, and
that, under the law of nations, all areas claimed by it were inland
waters. The utilization of a straight baseline to circumscribe the
"overall unit area" was justified on the basis of the Fisheries Case
and article 4 of the Geneva Convention.103 Similarly, the claim to
Monterey Bay was, in California's view, sanctioned by article 5 of
the Convention. The remainder of the areas, while not true "bays"
under international law, were claimed by the state on the th~ory
that the indentations qualified as inland waters under recognized
exceptions to that law. Specifically, California relied on the doctrine
of historic waters, under which a nation's claim to extraordinary
areas as inland waters is valid upon a showing of a continuous exercise of uncontested and exclusive jurisdiction.104
The Supreme Court summarily rejected California's initial contention that the Submerged Lands Act constituted a congressional
sanction of state "beliefs" as to the extent of their inland waters. In
this regard, the Court stated:
Indeed, if the Court is to draw any inference from the intent
and structure of the Act as to how inland waters should be defined, the most plausible inference would be that Congress, in
adopting the three-mile limitation, must have intended some
base line to be used other than one dependent upon each
State's subjective concept of its inland waters, for such a limitation would prove to have been none at all .•..105
103. See text following note 65 supra.
104. For a general discussion of the historic-waters doctrine, see Direct United
States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C. 1877) (Newfoundland); Judicial Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/143 (1962); Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/1 (1957).
105. 381 U.S. at 158-60.
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The Court's initial conclusion reduced the issue to a direct clash
between nvo sources of interpretation of the term "inland waters."
California relied on international law; the United States relied on
the policy of the executive branch. Unfortunately, while the conflict
may have been clear, its resolution was not. Both positions suffered
from serious d~ficiencies, and the adoption of either one in its entirety would have created more complexity than would have been
resolved.
If international' law is looked to as the basis upon which to interpret a 1953 statute, a determination must be made as to the manner in which inland waters were defined by the law of nations at
the relevant date. The difficulty with· this procedure is that, except
for a few extremely vague rules of relationship between lands and
waters, there were no internationally recognized principles of definition in 1953. In fact, the International Court had specifically rejected
the existence of any mathematically precise rules for delineating bays
or any other inland water areas.106 Therefore, if the Submerged
Lands Act were to be interpreted in accordance with international
law in force at the time of its adoption, courts would be faced with
the incredibly complex task of determining the inland waters of each
state by utilizing the geographical, economic, and historical stand- .
ards announced by the International Court.107
Even assuming that this multitude of subjective determinations
could be made as a practical matter, the application of international
law in this area is still subject to a basic objection. That law establishes the maximum extent of inland waters which may be claimed
by a coastal nation, but it does not pretend to establish national
boundaries at that point. Similarly, while California might have
argued that its claims to inland waters could have been made by the
United States, it would still have been faced with the burden of
showing that the federal government had actually sought to exercise rights to the maximum extent sanctioned by international law.
Moreover, this burden would appear to be almost insuperable in
view of the specific rejection of the full exercise of international
rights by the Secretary of State at the time the Submerged Lands
Act was adopted.108
The United States' reliance on the contemporaneous policy of
the executive branch as a basis for interpreting the act admittedly
106. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
107. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
108. Letters of Acting Secretary Webb and Secretary Acheson, Hearings on S.J.
Res. 1J Before the Senate Committee on Int. and Ins. Affairs, 83d Cong., ,1st Sess.
460-62 (1953).
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avoided the difficulties of subjectivity. Executive policy defining inland waters, which had been carefully explained to Congress,100 consisted of the adoption of the ten-mile closing line for bays and a flat
rejection of the straight-baseline theory. However, although the
policy was clear, it was apparently unacceptable. The Senate Committee specifically refused to approve the policy,11° and there is no
evidence in the debates of a contrary intent on the part of Congress
as a whole.
Notwithstanding the refusal of Congress to sanction the State
Department's policy on inland waters, the Government argued that
the act should still be interpreted in accordance with that position.
In the Government's view, acts of Congress utilizing the terminology
of foreign affairs must be interpreted in accordance with the policy
of the executive branch, unless Congress specifically rejects that
policy. While this position is clearly justified when the congressional
act in question involves foreign affairs,111 it is totally unfounded as
applied to domestic legislation. As the Supreme Court has pointed
out, the Submerged Lands Act involves a division of offshore resources as between the state and federal governments and is unrelated to foreign affairs. The policy of the executive branch, which
is vested with authority over foreign relations, is therefore of no
relevancy in ascertaining the definition of a term used in purely
domestic legislation.
The Supreme Court's resolution of the interpretative problems
created by the necessity of defining inland waters for the purposes
of the Submerged Lands Act is an outstanding example of pragmatic
judicial reasoning. The Court sought not so much a standard that
was theoretically defensible as one that would work. While its decision may defy complete logical justification, it unquestionably
represents a reasonable solution to a problem which appeared, at
least superficially, insoluble. -The major problem of interpretationthat of determining what standards Congress intended by its use of
the term "inland waters"-was disposed of by the Court's holding
109. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 90 8: 91 supra.
111. Cf. In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892), where congressional re-adoption of an
act asserting jurisdiction in the Bering Sea was interpreted as incorporating the
previous understanding of the executive branch. The Court commented: "[T)here
is much force in the position that, whatever the reason for the conservative course
pursued by the Senate [in not defining the extent of jurisdiction in the Bering Sea), the
enactment of this section, with full knowledge of the executive action already had
and of the diplomatic situation, justified the President in the conclusion that it was
his duty ••• to adhere to the construction already insisted upon as to the e.xtent of
the dominion of the United States, and to continue to act accordingly," Id, at li02,
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that Congress had intended no standards whatsoever. In the Court's
view, "Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for defining inland waters to this Court." 112 More significant, the Court
stated that "it is our opinion that we best fill our responsibility of
giving content to the words which Congress employed by adopting
the best and most workable definitions available." 113
It is obvious, of course, that a "responsibility for defining inland
waters" is substantially different from adoption of a "workable definition." Every judicial interpretation of a legislative act involves a
responsibility for definition. This truism, however, is no justification
for deliberate judicial adoption of definitions, and, indeed, the
Court has commonly rejected attempts by Congress to delegate its
responsibilities.114 In this instance, however, the Court found just
such a delegation and specifically accepted it without extended discussion. With this freedom to select standards of definition which
would prove most "workable," the· Court turned to those of greatest
certainty. It adopted in toto the definitions of the Geneva Convention of the Law of the Sea, which was written five years after passage
of the Submerged Lands Act and which did not become effective
until over ten years after passage of the act. The Court stated:
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, approved by the Senate and ratified by the President, provides such [workable] definitions. We adopt them for purposes
of the Submerged Lands Act. This establishes a single coastline
for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and
the conduct of our future international relations (barring an
unexpected change in the rules established by the Convention).
Furthermore the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides
answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines
which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome.11 5
The selection of the Convention as a source of definition did not,
in itself, resolve all the issues in the case. It was still necessary for
the Court to apply those definitions to the particular water areas involved. One area? that of Monterey Bay, lent itself to easy resolution.
Since this indentation clearly met the requirements of article 7 of
the Convention for a "bay"116 and was only eighteen miles wide at
112. 381 U.S. at 164.
113. Id. at 165.
114. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United States v. Todd, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 52 (1794). See also Annot., 168 A.L.R. 826 (1947); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 267 (1930).
115. 381 U.S. at 165.
116. See note 65 supra.
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its mouth, it satisfied the criteria necessary for classification as inland
waters.117
In contrast, California's claim to certain coastal indentations as
"historic waters" was summarily denied. In the Court's view, there
was not a sufficient showing of the continuous and exclusive authority over the waters necessary for justification of such a claim under
the Convention. In passing, the Court refused to sanction the Government's argument that no claim could be made to historic waters
unless endorsed by the federal government. The relevancy of a
Government disclaimer was recognized, but only in situations where
claims were "questionable." The Court was reluctant to hold that
such a disclaimer would be effective to bar clearly defined historic
claims, and therefore at least impliedly left this issue for later determination.118
The most difficult question involved the validity of California's
utilization of straight baselines to include the "overall unit area." 119
While much of the argument centered on whether the California
coast satisfied the criteria necessary for the establishment of such
baselines under international law,120 the Court never reached an
analysis of this issue. It denied California's claim, holding that the
authority to extend inland waters by the straight-baseline method
was vested exclusively in the federal government, and that
California may not use such baselines to extend our international boundaries ... against the expressed opposition of the
United States. . . . [A]n extension of state sovereignty to an
international area by claiming it as inland water would necessarily also extend national sovereignty, and unless the Federal
Government's responsibility for questions of external sovereignty is hollow, it must have the power to prevent States from
so enlarging themselves. 121
California's utilization of straight baselines was dubious at best,
but the Court's theory of rejection also appears unsound. An "extension" of California's inland water boundary under the terms of
the Submerged Lands Act would not, at least in theory, impinge on
federal responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, in two cases involving Texas and Florida the Court specifically recognized that a
boundary established for the purposes of the Submerged Lands Act
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

381
Id.
See
See
381

U.S. at 172.
at 175.
text accompanying note 101 supra.
text following note 55 supra.
U.S. at 168.
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in excess of the national claim did not create conflicts with foreign
policy.122 While the waters in question in those two cases were
marginal-sea areas, the same principles should be applicable to
inland waters.
It would appear that strict reliance on the terms of the Geneva
Convention would have resulted in a similar rejection of California's
baseline claim without the necessity of raising the spectre of state
interference in foreign affairs. Under the permissive terms of the
Convention, waters are considered inland only if a coastal nation
makes the necessary assertion of jurisdiction. Without that assertion,
the waters continue to be high or marginal seas, as the case may be.
California's utilization of baselines would have resulted in the enclosure of waters which, under the terms of the Convention, were
regarded as high seas by the federal government. The enclosure,
because of its limited effect, would not have conflicted with foreign
policy, but rather with the judicially adopted definition of inland
waters for the purposes of the Submerged Lands Act.
The existence of apparent logical difficulties should not diminish
the significance of the California decision. For the purposes of
inland-water definition, the Court has selected an eminently "workable" framework. With only limited exceptions, the problems
created by inland-bay measurement have been resolved. Similarly,
numerous minor difficulties inherent in inland-water measurement
are clarified by adoption of the provisions of the Geneva Convention
in the same manner that they were clarified in international law.
While future Executive action may again raise questions concerning
straight baselines, it is at least settled that the system may not at
present be used to define the inland waters of any state.

E. A Proposed Definition of the Inland Waters of the States
Superficial analysis of the California decision may lead to the
conclusion that all major issues concerning inland-water boundary
delineation have been judicially resolved. Such an assumption, however, is inconsistent with the limited nature of the holding. In fact,
the only issue before the Court in California was a definition of
inland-water boundaries for the purposes of the Submerged Lands
Act. While the holding in effect established an inland-water boundary for those states which extended their boundaries under authority
of the act, it neither attempted nor purported to affect state bound122, See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
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aries established by Congress prior or subsequent to the passage of
the act. As a necessary conclusion to this analysis of inland waters,
therefore, it is relevant to consider the manner in which the inlandwater boundary for the remaining states will be defined. The distinction suggested here is subtle, but nevertheless significant. Each
state entered the Union with some express or implied boundary circumscribing its inland water areas. Obviously, the seaward limit
of inland waters necessary to a determination of the respective
boundaries must have had some meaning as of the date of admission,
but that meaning is not necessarily the same as the "seaward limit
of inland waters" as the term is used in the Submerged Lands Act.128
The possible existence of state boundaries distinct from those
established by the Submerged Lands Act suggests one obvious anomaly. Theoretically, at least, a state might enter the Union with inland
waters in excess of the specifications in the Submerged Lands Act;
by virtue of the holding in Pollard v. Hagan, 124 all lands underlying
those inland waters are subject to state ownership as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. As a result, the state would possess more
lands under the Pollard doctrine than it would through the Submerged Lands Act.
Before attempting to define the inland waters of the various
states outside the scope of the Submerged Lands Act, one important
fact should be noted: not a single act of admission specifies, with any
degree of clarity, the extent of inland waters within the various
states' boundaries. The few acts of admission or congressionally
approved state constitutions which do contain any maritime boundary provisions are couched in the most general of terms. California's
constitution, for instance, makes reference to "bays," without further
definition. 120 Alaska's act of admission defines the state as including
appurtenant '.'territorial waters," but there is no particularization
of the means by which those waters are to be measured. 120 Other
acts contain similar, or even less specific, language.127
123. The Supreme Court was careful to note the distinction in its analysis of the
meaning of the Submerged Lands Act. In the Court's view, congressional insertion
of § 2(b), which restricted the extent of state boundaries for purposes of the act to
not more than three miles from the coast, was a specific limitation on the historic
boundaries of the states. Without that limitation on the grant, the Court's analysis
would necessarily have been directed toward the historic nature of state claims over
inland waters and, more specifically, the maximum extent of inland waters which
had been expressly or impliedly approved for the states when Congress admitted
them to the Union. See 381 U.S. at 150-60.
124. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
125. Constitution of 1849, art. XII.
126. Act of July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 339.
127. See acts of admission of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi cited note 21
supra.

February 1966]

Maritime Boundaries

667

The problem of interpretation, therefore, is not alleviated by
the existence of a stated maritime boundary. Delineation of inland
waters is no less complex a task in that context than is a derivation
of the term from general principles which recognize that a state
with no defined maritime boundary has "inherent sovereignty" over
inland waters, the seaward limit of which, together with the low.
water mark on the shore, comprises its coast. In both cases an analysis
must be made of the manner in which inland waters were defined
at the time the state entered the Union, for it is reasonable to assume
fropi analogous situations that the boundary was determined as of
that date.128 In this regard, the problem is strikingly similar to the
one faced by the Court in the second California case. Some basis for
interpretation must be utilized, and the selection of any particular
source is at least as difficult as the situation which confronted the
Court.
If international law is utilized as a means of delineating the
coast of a particular state, the difficulties inherent in the absence of
clear standards of measurement are obvious. Courts would be faced
with vague tests involving economic and geographic factors peculiar
to the subject state, and ascertainment of the boundary would be a
purely subjective matter, not subject to any predictable certainty.
In addition, severe inequities could be created among the states.
Our developing technology implies that the later the state is admitted, the greater will be the nexus which exists between the land
and adjoining maritime areas, since the technology makes that nexus
possible. Since such a relationship is at the heart of the decision in
the Fisheries Case, states which joined the Union recently would be
able to claim much greater areas of inland waters than would the
states admitted earlier.
An alternative means of determining inland waters as of the
date of admission of a state is to look not to general principles of
international law, but rather to the United States' application of
those principles. However, there are three difficulties involved in
this approach. First, it assumes that the executive branch had a
clearly defined policy on inland waters at the time the various coastal
states were admitted. Yet, in the pre-1912 period, when the vast
majority of states were admitted, and certainly prior to 1888, when
the ten-mile rule for bays was first proposed, the United States' position on inland waters was somewhat confused.
128. On admission to the Union, each state receives title to land underlying
"navigable" waters within its boundaries. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243, 260 (1913); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1894). "Navigability" is determined as of the date of admission. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
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A second objection to utilization of the policy of the executive
branch to define inland waters for a state lies in the fact that such
a procedure would be unrelated to the basis for which the policy was
initially formulated. The executive branch, vested with full authority over foreign affairs, has the power to limit state authority within
established boundaries. However, effectuation of sound foreign
policy does not require that the boundaries be set at the limiting
point. Indeed, there is no rational foundation for using standards
adopted for purposes of foreign policy to define state boundaries
when the boundary, in and of itself, does not affect that policy.
The third objection to defining state inland-water boundaries
through reference to Executive policy is one of practicality. This
method of definition would create serious inequities between the
states which, although perhaps constitutionally permissible, would
be logically indefensible. The policy of the executive branch on
inland waters is dictated by the exigencies of foreign affairs, which
may change from day to day. Thus, if the states' inland water boundaries had been fixed by the policy of the executive branch at the
time they entered the Union, many states would have a six-mile
closing line for bays, and those admitted after 1888 would have a
ten-mile closing line. Similarly, because of the change in Executive
policy in 1961,129 any states admitted to the Union after that date
would have a 24-mile closing line for bays, and if in the future
the State Department modified its policy to adopt straight baselines,
new states would come in with inland-water boundaries completely
unrelated to those of previous states. As a practical matter, it would
seem far better to utilize some system of boundary definition which
produces. uniform inland-water boundaries throughout all the
coastal states rather than make the issue tum on the day-to-day
problems of foreign affairs.
As suggested by California's argument in reference to the Submerged Lands Act,13° there is conceivably a third framework within
which to determine the extent of a state's inland waters on the date
of its admission into the Union. It is arguable that in passing Dthe
act Congress impliedly recognized as valid the states' beliefs as to
the location of their boundaries insofar as inland waters are concerned; however, the Supreme Court's analysis in California to the
effect that such a limitation would prove to be "none at all" 181
129. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
130. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
131. See ibid.
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applies with equal effect in this context. In addition, the argument
can apply equally well in reverse. It is just as easy to assume that
when a state enters the Union without a geographically described
inland-water boundary, by implication it accepts the congressional
understanding of where that boundary lies. Indeed, if a selection
must be made between these two alternatives, the latter would
appear to be the better, since it is consistent with the established
doctrine that Congress alone has the authority to set state boundaries.
Delineation of the inland-water boundaries of the states, therefore, will present the same difficulties which accompanied the definition of inland waters for the purpose of the Submerged Lands Act.
There is no reason to assume that the courts will adopt any different
philosophy than has been exhibited by the Supreme Court in the
related context of the California case. If the Supreme Court was
·willing to assume that Congress left to the courts the "selection"
of a standard for definition of inland waters in the Submerged Lands
Act, is there any reason to assume that the same analysis will not be
utilized for interpreting congressional acts defining state boundaries?
Certainly the practical reasons for selecting the Geneva Convention as a basis for defining inland waters under the Submerged Lands
Act were no more pressing than those attending the need t<;> delineate the inland-water boundaries of the states. First, the Geneva
Convention supplies the sort of objective standards of measurement
which are desirable in ascertaining the extent of a boundary. Second,
the standards in the Convention are reasonable, and represent an
international consenS\lS as well as the policy of our own national
government. Third, selection of the same standard of measurement
utilized in the Submerged Lands Act avoids the possible anomaly
noted earlier132 that a few states might otherwise receive vast areas
of submerged lands which would have been denied to sister states
similarly located.
Of course, a standard of definition for• inland-water boundaries
adopted years after any state entered the Union raises obvious logical
problems. These problems, however, are no greater than those which
confronted the Court in the California case, and, while not necessarily susceptible of easy refutation, should prove equally simple to
avoid.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are, of course, certain remaining problems of boundary
delineation. Outstanding among these is the determination of a basis
132. See text accompanyin.g note 124 supra.
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for defining "historic waters" within the boundaries of the states.
First, the standards by which claims to historic waters will be measured must be established, a matter which could possibly be resolved
by reference to the requirement of the Geneva Convention that there
have been an exercise of continuous and exclusive authority. Second,
assuming established standards, a determination will be required
as to which authority, state or federal, must assert the necessary
claim. Judging from the Supreme· Court's analysis of the propriety
of California's straight-baseline method, it is reasonable to assume
that a state's exercise of jurisdiction will be deemed insufficient.
These tentative conclusions, however, suggest the most difficult
problem..Assuming that a state claims that federal authority has
been extended to certain waters, -What significance will be placed
on a specific present disclaimer by the executive branch of either
past or present jurisdiction over the area?
The continued existence of difficult problems does not detract
from the fact that the basic rules of boundary delineation are now
either established or reasonably predictable. Commencing with the
first California case, and culminating with the second, the Supreme
Court has created a framework for orderly division of maritime
jurisdiction between state and federal authorities. Those rules repre•
sent a major step in bringing order from chaos in this field of the
law.
·

